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4      This is a revised version of a paper presented at the ECSA World Conference, Brussels, May1
5-6, 1994. It deals with topics treated in greater detail in two papers prepared for the European
Science Foundation Project “Beliefs in Government”. Following further work, these will be
published in due course in Niedermayer and Sinnott, forthcoming, 1995. I am grateful to the
participants in Workshop VIII at the ECSA World Conference and especially to the participants
in Group 2 of the “Beliefs in Government” project for their stimulating input. Without involving
them in any responsibility for remaining imperfections, I am also indebted to Brigid Laffan, Anna
Murphy, Giandomenico Majone and Wolfgang Wessels for helpful comments.
       The notion of a continuum is used in a similar fashion in a slightly different context by2
Wallace (Wallace, 1990, p.44). It should be noted that there is some dispute as to whether the
term internationalised or global governance includes international regimes. Thus, Rosenau
explicitly excludes the concept of regimes from the definition of 'global governance' (Rosenau,
1992, p.9). The more inclusive concept adopted here is in line with Kratochwil and Ruggie's
understanding of the term: '...international regimes were thought to express both the parameters
and the perimiters of international governance.... In sum, in order to resolve both disciplinary and
real-world puzzles, the process of international governance has come to be associated with the
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Introduction
The aim of the first part of this paper   is to examine the relationship between public1
opinion and the internationalisation of governance.  It does so by reviewing theories of
political integration and some aspects of international relations theory. Arising from this
theoretical review, the second half of the paper addresses the specific question of the
internationalisation of issues and the implications of various forms of internationalisation
for the problem of  legitimacy. Before proceeding to part I, however, it is necessary to
elaborate  briefly on the term `internationalised governance.   
The notion of internationalised governance involves an analogy.   In some
instances, as for example with the doctrines of direct effect and of the supremacy of EC
law as developed by the European Court of Justice, the analogy to domestic political
systems, defined in terms of the 'authoritative allocation of values' (Easton, 1975, p.50),
is fairly precise. In other instances, in which states accept some minimal institutionalised
constraints on their behaviour, it is more tenuous.  These latter instances comprise
institutions for the management of interdependence.  In the international relations
literature, such institutions are referred to as 'international regimes', succinctly defined
by Keohane and Nye as "the sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of
interdependence" (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.19). The matter may be put  another way
by saying that internationalised governance spans   a continuum  from a fully fledged
international governmental system - political union - through a more rudimentary system
- the European Community as it is now (notwithstanding the explicit claim to 'union' in
the Masstricht Treaty) -  to the weaker forms of internationalised governance
comprising a variety of  international regimes .   2
5concept of international regimes... (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p. 759-760).
      Another early strand of integration theory can be identified, i.e., Mitrany's functionalism.3
This, however, has tended to be as much normative as analytical and has failed to generate a
substantial research agenda (see the critique in Lodge, 1978)
       Using quantitative indicators, Caporaso and Keeler demonstrate the decline in 'theory-driven4
scholarship' in what they call the doldrum years (circa 1975-86). However, they also argue,
convincingly, that research in that period should not be neglected and that it did contribute,
mostly, indirectly, to theory building. The point here is that such research was only implicity
theoretical and did not address the kinds of issues posed in this paper or follow up on the
theoretical insights of the revisionist period (see Caparaso and Keeler, 1993, pp.16-25).  
       Putnam has noted the continuity between the tradition of theorizing about regional5
integration initiated by Deutsch and Haas and  regime theory: 'The intellectual heirs of this
tradition, such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, emphasised interdependence and
transnationalism, but the role of domestic factors slipped more and more out of focus, particularly
as the concept of international regimes came to dominate the subfield' (Putnam, 1988, p. 431)
 Part I: The role of public opinion in  political integration theory and in theories of
international relations. 
The theory of political integration can be thought of as having gone through three
phases. The first phase consisted of two  ambitious initial formulations (transactionalism
and neo-functionalism) in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  A second short-lived phase,3
characterised by an intense revisionism, can be identified in the late 1960s and early
1970s. However, despite the theoretical progress made in this second phase, afterwards
integration theory suffered near fatal asphyxia in the Euro-stagnation of the late 1970s.
The third, contemporary phase is therefore a revival if not a resurrection . In addition to4
considering these three phases, this part of the  paper digresses briefly to deal with the
related theories of disintegration and diversity. It concludes by attempting to incorporate
some insights from regime theory  and from international relations theory more5
generally. 
 Phase I: Transactionalism and Neo-functionalism
"Sense of community"  is an essential element in the transactionalist concept of
integration. It is defined as:
"...a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual
consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually
successful predictions of behaviour, and of  co-operative action in accordance with it..."
(Deutsch et al, 1957, p.36). 
6The centrality of public opinion and political culture in this definition is underlined by a
consideration of twelve conditions that are seen to be essential to the process of
integration. These conditions include: mutual compatibility of main values; a distinctive
way of life, i.e., values, institutions and habits of action that mark the area off from
major neighbours; unbroken links of social communication both across territories and
across strata; broadening of the political elite, both in regard to recruitment from wider
strata and in regard to connections between strata; mobility of persons  and a
multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction; and  mutual predictability of
behaviour (for a full list of the conditions and more detailed discussion see Sinnott,
1993a). It is true that a narrow operationalisation of the concept of "politically relevant
strata" would confine measurement of the above conditions  to some segment of the
political elite, thus depriving the theory of reference to mass political culture and public
opinion. This will be taken up again below, but, in the meantime, it   would seem that a
narrow operationalisation would  be unduly restrictive in the latter half of the twentieth
century, when a strong case can be made that the  politically relevant stratum includes a
sizeable section of the mass public. 
In contrast to the above, the distinctive neo-functionalist concepts  relate to the
role and activities of the integrationist elites and the significance of the policy process in
which they are involved, i.e., the mechanisms of supranational bureaucratic problem-
solving  and spillover  (Haas and Schmitter, 1964, pp.705-737). Indeed Haas defined
integration as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings
are persuaded to shift loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states"
(Haas, 1958, p.16). The denial of the relevance of mass attitudes in the integration
process is made quite explicit by Haas when he elaborates on this definition of political
integration. He explains at some length that the "political actors" in the definition are
"elites", i.e., "the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the
making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as
spokesmen of political parties" (Haas, 1958, p. 16). Consistent with this, he argues that
"it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and
attitude surveys.."(ibid.). 
It was precisely this exclusive emphasis on political elites that was to be
challenged by revisionist neo-functionalism. Before turning to this, however, it is worth
digressing to look at the other side of the coin, i.e., at theories that seek to explain the
many manifestations of disintegration within states and of persistent diversity between
them. 
 
 
Theories of Disintegration and Diversity
 The core-periphery theory of disintegration can be summarised very briefly. The
starting point is that industrialisation - the engine of modernisation - is inherently
uneven. Unevenness leads to inequality between geographically defined units, i.e.,
between core and periphery. At this stage, however, conflict is not inevitable. The
outcome depends on certain pre-existing cultural conditions. If the units are culturally
heterogeneous, then the cultural differentiae provide the means to remedy the
inequitable situation and the remedial strategy is national secession (Gellner, 1964 pp.
7171-172). Of course not all nation-states are the result of peripheral secession. What is
needed then is not just a theory of disintegration but also a theory of persistent diversity. 
Hoffmann's article 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the
Case of Western Europe' (Hoffmann 1966) was probably the most formidable
intellectual challenge to the integration theorists. While much of the emphasis is on
national interests and on the activities and importance of political elites, the argument
frequently refers to the popular basis of elite action and to 'national consciousness'. An
inventory of sources of either diversity or integration culled from Hoffmann would
include the following: a negative, non-purposive national consciousness; a national
conscience that is too strong (the French case)  or too weak (the German case); the
comprehensiveness of the modern state (in the sense of its broad functional scope, well
established authority and popular basis); an intense and positive general will or
enlightened national patriotism capable of prodding leaders into political integration;
and, the theme to be taken up in detail in part II, transnational political issues of interest
to all political forces and publics across boundary lines.
What is striking in all of this is that when we look at Gellner and Hoffmann
together, it is apparent that the (implicit or explicit) critics of integration theory had a
more profound grasp of the significance of political cultural variables than had the early
neo-functionalists. In this respect they had more in common with the transactionalist
version of integration theory, though, obviously, the emphasis and the conclusions
drawn were different. 
Phase II: Public Opinion Rediscovered
 
 What has been described above as the revisionist phase of integration theory is
embodied in a wide-ranging collection of essays published in 1971 (Lindberg and
Scheingold, 1971). Here, the limitations of space only permit a brief review of three of
the contributions to that volume. In an introductory overview,  Haas explicitly withdrew
his earlier exclusion of the need to pay any attention to public opinion. This is
particularly evident in his new 'master concept' of authority legitimacy transfer or
sharing, "a formulation", he says, "I would myself prefer to the stress put on elite
loyalties in my own earlier formulations". Indicators of this concept are said to be
observable in activity in specific functional and organisational sectors and ... in elite and 
mass perceptions
  (Haas, 1971, pp.26-30, emphasis added). 
Schmitter's contribution to the rexamination of neo-functionalism was also
consciously revisionist: 'This article offers an updated target - a revised formalisation of
the neo-functionalist or structuralist theory of the political consequences of regional
integration with pretensions to general comparative relevance" (Schmitter, 1971, p.
233). Several of the variables and hypotheses in Schimitter's complex scheme involve
the attitudes and perceptions of a segment of the population. That segment is designated
by such phrases as "national participant political groups", "national elites attentive to
integration issues" "relevant elites" and "participants or observers in regional processes".
It all depends, therefore, on whether one takes a broad or narrow definition of these
groups. Schmitter does not explicitly address this question but a broad definition is
clearly implied by his operationalisation of the variables in question. Thus the variable
"elite value complementarity", is operationalised by reference to 'panel type survey data
8on the nature and intensity of commitment to similar goals within and across integrating
units relative initially to specific contexts of proposed regional collaboration'. That the
operationalisation includes mass public opinion data is clear from the accompanying
footnote which includes reference to Inglehart's work on public opinion and European
integration. Similarly, regional identity is operationalised by reference to "panel survey
research on selected samples exposed to intensive regional socialisation; inference from
single surveys on residual importance of regional contacts/level of information when
controlled for other variables" and the work of Inglehart is again cited (Schmitter, 1971,
p. 252). It is clear, therefore, that this major restatement of neo-functionalism explicitly
assigns a substantial role to public opinion.
Nye begins with the Deutsch and Haas definitions of integration and argues that
the latter in particular must be disaggregated into economic, social, and political
dimensions. Each of these three dimensions is further subdivided, political integration
being seen in terms of four categories:  institutional, policy, security-community, and
attitudinal (Nye, 1971, pp. 24-48). Attitudinal integration, also  described as "identitive
appeal", figures in one of an expanded list of "process mechanisms". Secondly, public
opinion enters the model as a variable in the domestic arena influencing the actions of
national political leaders.  Actors in the original neo-functionalist model - mainly the
integrationist technocrats and interest group representatives - need to be supplemented
by "electoral or support politicians" whose primary function is to legitimise the actions
involved in regional integration. This implies a very clear role for public opinion in the
process of integration. Perhaps the key concept in this regard and one of particular
contemporary relevance is   politicisation.  This involves a "broadening of the arena of
participants" in which "political legitimising decision-makers and broad political opinion
become more heavily involved as integration decisions make heavier incursions upon
national sovereignty and the identitive functions of the states." Discussion of the impact
of politicisation on the prospects for integration leads to the hypothesis that such
prospects may be imperilled by premature politicisation before supportive attitudes have
become intense and structured (Nye, 1971, p.89). (for a full list of propositions derived
from the Hass, Schmitter and Nye revisions of neo-functionalism, see Sinnott, 1994a).
Given all of this theoretical ferment, it may be asked: why did this new emphasis
not make an immediate impact on the research agenda? The problem was that, almost as
soon as this broadening of the theory occurred and before it could really take hold, the
theory itself seemed to be by-passed by events and explicitly or implicitly treated as
obsolescent by its authors. As already suggested, it was rescued from oblivion by the
resurgence of European integration in the mid 1980s.  
         
Phase III: Integration Theory Revived
 Since the revival of integration theory is still quite recent and since it involves
many different strands, it would be premature to attempt a synthesis. All that will be
aimed at here is to signal the extent to which the 'new theory' incorporates a core
concern with public opinion. Thus for example, Wallace simply takes it as read that
expectations, common identity or consciousness, and a "sense of community" are
essential elements of political integration, though it is acknowledged that they are  "the
most contested, because the most difficult to measure" (Wallace, 1990. p. 9).  
9Keohane and Hoffmann's emphasis on the compatibility of statist and neo-
functionalist approaches, leads them to envisage "domestic backlashes" or "revolts"
against the economic hardships the single market might impose on certain sectors,
professions or regions and to a  concern about the democratic deficit and the paradox of
"integrated economies and separate politics, the paradox of an elaborate process of
multinational bargaining coexisting with an obstinately national process of political life
and elections, the paradox of the emergence of a European identity on the world scene
coexisting with continuing national loyalties. (pp. 294-295). More recently, Caparaso
and Keeler have identified the issue of 'to what extent will further integration necessitate
the sort of shift in mass loyalties with which Deutsch and Haas were both concerned, if
from very different perspectives, decades ago' as one of the key areas for research
(Caparaso and Keeler, 1993, p. 49). Finally even theories that  are primarily concerned
with elite bargaining and  international structural change incorporate the expectation
that broader political debate will develop and that 'the move to 1992 is likely to be
accompanied by social and political mobilisation at the European level' (Sandholtz and
Zysman 1989, p. 122). 
 
 
Regimes and Legitimacy
  
 An emphasis on the importance of the problem of legitimacy is not limited to
integration theory. It will be argued here that such an emphasis is implicit in regime
theory and in aspects of international relations theory. Yet, this seems counter-intuitive.
Are regimes, and international affairs generally, not the ultimate preserve of elites?
Faced with the prima facie case that public opinion is utterly remote from and irrelevant
to international regimes, it should be noted first of all that the standard definition of
regimes includes attitudes,  albeit attitudes held by elites. The definition is: 'sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. In this
definition, principles are 'beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude' and norms are
'standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations' (Krasner 1983, p. 2).
The question is: are the principles and norms adopted by elites utterly unrelated to
trends in public opinion and political culture?  
Several of the regime theorists have, at least implicitly, addressed this issue.
Thus Krasner distinguishes between, on the one hand, endogenous norms and principles
that are 'the critical defining characteristics of any given regime' and, on the other,
'norms and principles that influence the regime in a particular issue area but are not
directly related to that issue area'. He refers to the latter as 'diffuse values' and argues
that they  can be regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence and dissipation of
regimes (Krasner p. 16). In similar vein,  Puchala and Hopkins  distinguish between
superstructure and substructure or between diffuse and specific regimes. (Puchala and
Hopkins, 1983, p. 64-65). Both Krasner and Puchala and Hopkins identify a very similar
set of diffuse values that currently condition the formation of international regimes.
According to Krasner, this set includes the principle of sovereignty and the related
notions of 'exclusive control within a delimited geographic area and the untrammelled
right to self-help internationally' (Krasner, p. 18).  Similarly, Puchala and Hopkins argue
that the "current norms that legitimise national self-determination, sanctify sovereign
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equality, proscribe international intervention in domestic affairs, and permit international
coercion, are all general principles of our world order" (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983, pp.
64-65). 
       The main repository of diffuse values such as those just mentioned may be various
international institutions and traditional procedures and the elites who operate them.
There is no denying this, but there may be a need for qualification. The qualification is
that such traditions and values exist in a broad cultural milieu of which public opinion is
a part. We can take the very values that have just been cited as an example. In
November 1991, The Economist, while cautioning against the temptation to exaggerate
a tendency or extrapolate a trend, suggested that there was a new development in
international affairs involving co-operation between states for agreed ends "on a scale
that hitherto only idealists have even dreamed about". According to the leading article, a
significant part of the impetus to such co-operation is "world opinion", which, "when
confronted by television pictures of genocide or starvation, is unimpressed by those who
say, ‘We cannot get involved. National sovereignty must be respected. National
sovereignty be damned: the UN is already involved in Iraq" (The Economist, 1991).
The Economist
 argues that the UN is just one example of "the new interference" and
that it goes well beyond events related to the Gulf war. It also argues that the
democratic legitimacy of the trend is vital to its success. Of course, a leading article in 
The Economist
 proves nothing. It could be regarded merely as the clever but ephemeral
speculation typical of leading articles. Indeed in the wake of the subsequent vicissitudes
of international intervention in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda, some would no doubt
argue that The Economist was suffering from an unwonted bout of premature
optimism. But this would be to miss the point. The current debate about international
intervention and about the often tragic situations that create a demand for it is not about
the pros and cons of sovereignty but about the practicalities and modalities of
interfering. From a theoretical point of view, what the debate illustrates is how the
current set of values that condition the formation of regimes might be undergoing 
change and, in line with our argument that diffuse regime values are imbedded in a
wider culture, it suggests that public opinion may be a factor in the process. 
      Concern with the impact of public opinion  has also begun to surface in international
relations theory more generally.  Thus Rosenau, for whom this has admittedly long been
a preoccupation, argues that '...the micro level of individuals has to be integrated into
the analysis [of the emerging global order] because structures at the macro level seem
increasingly vulnerable to shifts in the skills and orientations of the publics they
encompass' and that we must proceed 'as if citizens at the micro level are variables
relevant to the emergent global order' (Rosenau, 1992b, p.274). Rosenaus treatment of
'interdependence issues' in his discussion emphasises the fact that, over and above 
contributing to the creation and maintenance of the underlying diffuse values and the
cultural context of regimes and internationalised governance, there is a second more
specific sense in which public opinion may feed into regime formation. Mass publics
may not know much about the NPT, the International Food Regime, or the Law of the
Sea, but they do have attitudes to nuclear weapons, world hunger and the 200-mile
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      These examples rather than the more obvious and certainly the more salient one of GATT6
have been deliberately chosen. It is quite evident that a specific section of mass public opinion in
many countries (i.e., farmers) have very definite views on GATT and that these views have been
directly relevant to what happens in that particular regime. The fact that farmers do not know
what a regime is or how and why this particular regime operates does not prevent their
preferences from being an important constraint on the regime actors. However, because it could
be argued that GATT is a very special case, it is not used here as part of the main argument. 
limit . Of course, policy concerns and preferences of this kind among the mass public6
are an indirect rather than a direct input into regime formation. The public will not have
an attitude as to whether a regime does or should exist; it may not even be aware of the
full international ramifications of a particular problem. However, by demanding
solutions to problems that are only soluble through concerted and sustained
international co-operation, public opinion may create a demand for regimes. Understood
in this sense, Hoffmann's postulate in his original critique of integration theory that
"transnational political issues of interest to all political forces and publics across
boundary lines are a prerequisite to political integration" (Hoffmann, 1966) is of central
importance. Such transnational political issues and their corresponding policy
preferences need not necessarily be seen by the public to be related to transnational
political processes. It is enough, as suggested here, that they create an indirect demand
for transnational political action. This notion of transnational or internationalised issues
will be taken up in a moment in Part II. First, however, because the consequences of the
shift in emphasis are quite fundamental,  it is worth documenting further the extent to
which international relations theory has been developing a concern with domestic
politics and, by implication therefore, with the role of public opinion. 
      The early development of regime theory had a clear systemic bias. The view was
that theorising that focused on the systemic level of analysis had the merit of parsimony.
However, there have been signs of a concerted rethink regarding this strategy. Thus, in 
a ten-year retrospective on Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye
acknowledge that 'The need for more attention to domestic politics, and its links to
international politics, leads us to believe that research at the systemic level alone may
have reached a point of diminishing returns' (Keohane and Nye, 1987, p. 753). In the
same year, a broad-ranging review of regime theory argued: 'Current theories of
international regimes have ignored domestic political processes, in part because of the
lure of parsimonious systemic theory.  ...there have been few studies of the domestic
political determinants of international co-operation. There are both methodological and
theoretical reasons to open the black box of domestic politics' (Haggard and Simmons,
1987, p.513). A substantial part of the lure of the systemic level of theorising was and
still is the compelling logic of game theory. But, for all its necessary simplifying
assumptions,  game theory need not, as is so often taken for granted, limit analysis to
the systemic level. In fact, Putnam has suggested the notion of two-level games as a
metaphor for domestic-international interactions. And public opinion figures explicitly in
the second-level (domestic) game:
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A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and
international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both
economic and non-economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not
simply executive officials and institutional arrangements (Putnam, 1988, p. 432).  
In summary, in seeking to understand the process of and prospects for political
integration and the more general phenomenon of the internationalisation of governance,
political culture, public opinion and legitimacy can neither be taken for granted nor
ignored. In the first place, it is clear that the exclusive emphasis on elites and the
dismissal of public opinion associated with early neofunctionalist theory does not reflect
the real thrust of integration theory as it developed from the first formulations through
various revisions to recent efforts at revival. Secondly, it is clear that the relevance of
public opinion applies not just to formal processes of regional integration or specifically
to the development of the European Community but, mutatis mutandis, it applies right
along the continuum of internationalised governance. Thirdly, it is clear that the
dimensions of public opinion that matter are manifold and include attitudes to
transnational or internationalised issues. 
 
  
PART II: Internationalised Issues, Subsidiarity and Legitimacy
 What is a transnational or, in the terms used here, an internationalised issue? Is
there any empirical evidence that there are issues that are of interest to all (or any)
political forces and publics across boundaries? If such issues do exist, what are the
implications for the legitimacy of internationalised governance, particularly in the light
of the commitment to the principle of subsidiarity?
There are three ways in which issues may become internationalised - attributed
internationalisation, exogenous internationalisation and endogenous internationalisation. 
From the perspective of public opinion, the most obvious way in which an issue may be
internationalised is if competence in problem solving or policy-making is attributed to an
internationalised agency by the public. It must be emphasised that this is a subjective
basis for internationalisation. It is a matter of how the public views problems and the
means of solving them. It must also be emphasised that it is a normative attribution, i.e.,
what matters is how the public thinks problems ought to be tackled rather than how it
perceives the actual competences of various levels of governance, perceptions which
may be more or less in accord with reality. 
In general it should be noted that all issue orientations and policy preferences
have either an implicit or explicit attribution dimension. In fact all policy orientations
have a dual object - the preferred solution to a problem and the agency to which the
public looks for a solution. In dealing with attitudes and policy preferences in a unitary
state context, we do not usually advert to the attribution aspect because competence for
most major issues is simply assumed to belong to the national government and it will
usually be quite obvious if a particular issue falls within the remit of local government. 
In established federal systems the attribution of competence is usually implicit but is
likely to become explicit in cases of jurisdictional conflict between the various levels of
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the federal system. It is in  such situations that it becomes a worthwhile object of
analysis. Because internationalised governance is a developing process rather than an
established system, the dual nature of policy relevant attitudes and in particular the
question of the extent to which the public attributes competence to the international
level are of considerable importance, especially from the point of view of the legitimacy
of internationalised governance. 
Attributed internationalisation of issues is only one of the sources of the agenda
of internationalised governance;  it is indeed arguable that it is the least important one.
Of considerably greater significance in terms of impelling governments to take concerted
international action in a form that tends towards the creation of regimes or stronger
modes of internationalised governance is the nature of certain problems. Some problems
require the intervention of internationalised governance if they are to be tackled.  Here 
the dimension of internationalisation arises from the very nature of the issue and exists
whether it is perceived by the public or not. This is because the  problem which gives
rise to the issue is one which penetrates or transcends borders and simply cannot be
dealt with within the confines of national policy-making.  Because the
internationalisation of the issue arises from the very nature of the problem to be tackled,
it is referred to here as endogenous internationalisation. 
Over and above these two modes, an issue may be internationalised by being
claimed by some agency of internationalised governance as lying within its competence. 
Here the international dimension is external to the issue and the process can therefore be
referred to as exogenous internationalisation.   Once agencies of internationalised
governance have been established and begin to set about their work, there is a fairly
strong probability that they will seek to expand the range of their activities. This is in
fact fundamental to the notion of "spillover", which is the key mechanism by which,
according to neo-functionalist theory, the integration process develops. 
The relationship between endogenous and exogenous internationalisation brings
us directly to the much-debated issue of subsidiarity.  In general, the subsidiarity debate
is a normative one, i.e., the question is: What should be the allocation of functions
between various sub-national, national and supra-national levels of governance?  The
principle of subsidiarity is embodied in Article G of the Maastricht Treaty as a
modification of Article 3 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities. The
relevant passage reads as follows: 
 In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can, therefore, by reason  of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community. (Treaty on European Union, Article G, par. 5)
 In the terminology outlined above, this and indeed the whole theory of
subsidiarity implies, first, that the priority lies with endogenous internationalisation in
the sense that it is the determining criterion. Secondly, it implies that the  categories of
exogenous and endogenous internationalisation of issues ought to overlap perfectly, i.e.,
that all those and only those issues that by their nature require an internationalised
response should be claimed by agencies of internationalised governance. Taking the
problem of legitimacy into account,  one could add that the category of attributed
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internationalisation should also coincide with these two, i.e., all issues that are by their
nature internationalised and that are therefore, in this ideal conception, claimed by some
internationalised agency, would be perceived by an attentive public to be within the
remit of internationalised governance.  If one were to represent this ideal situation in a
diagram, one would draw three equal and concentric circles and only one circle would
appear. 
To say that a perfect overlap of this sort is highly unlikely is an understatement. 
Somewhat more realistically, one might think of the situation as a set of three circles of
different sizes arranged as an outer, a middle and an inner circle. The outer circle would
represent those issues which are by their very nature internationalised.  The next circle
would be the subset of these to which agencies of internationalised governance lay
claim.  And the inner circle would represent the subset of these in regard to which the
public attributes competence to agencies of internationalised governance - see Figure 1. 
Even this model is, however, highly fanciful. In reality the relationship between the three
forms of internationalisation is likely to be complex, variable and issue-dependent.
Instead of being concentric, as in Figure 1, the circles  overlap and intersect, with
different issues falling into  the different subsets created by the intersections. 
This latter observation suggests that it might be useful to approach the problem
using set notation and Venn diagrams in order to provide a systematic account of the
overlaps and the intersections (see Figure 2). If we take all issues and designate the
three subsets of internationalised issues by the letters A, B and C (so that  set A =
internationalised by attribution; set B = exogenously internationalised and set C =
endogenously internationalised and U = the universal set, i.e., all problems and policy
options facing society, including issues at both national and sub-national level), we can
categorise the variety of ways in which issues can be internationalised (for an
introduction to the notation and its use, see Kemeny Snell and Thompson, pp. 45-57).
As a preliminary example, the simple case of Figure 1 above can be written as:  
 A G  B G  C
i.e., A is a subset of B which in turn is a subset of C. Likewise, we could describe the
ideal situation from the point of view of the theory of subsidiarity in terms of the
equality of the three sets of issues:
i.e., A  =  B = C 
and A F  B F  C = A  B  C
 We have suggested that neither of these accounts of the internationalisation of
issues is very plausible. Thus, for example, the public may attribute to agencies of
internationalised governance issues that do not inherently require internationalised
action.  They may even attribute competences to such agencies which the agencies do
not possess or  to which they do not aspire.  On the other hand,  in a process of
aggrandisement, agencies may claim competences in relation to issues which do not
inherently require an internationalised response. Much political analysis and debate in
Europe following the Danish "no" vote in May 1992 and up to and beyond the French
referendum assumed that just such aggrandisement was a significant  source of the
difficulties being experienced in the ratification process. 
All of this suggests that the problem of legitimacy in this area is not limited to
instances involving the  explicit attribution of competence by the public to an agency of
internationalised governance, i.e., it is not limited to  attributed internationalisation.
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      The evidence to be presented below on the role of public opinion is limited to the attribution7
of competence to the European Community on a series of issues in May 1989. More extensive
evidence is considered in Sinnott, 1994b.
       The considerable problems of opernationalizing the three concepts of attributed, exogenous8
and endogenous internationalisation are examined in Sinnott, 1994b. It should also be emphasised
that the concepts of attributed, endogenous and exogenous internationalisation do not in
themselves provide an explanation as to why competence for particular issues is allocated to an
agency of internationalised governance. For a discussion of this problem in the context of the
European Community, see Majone, 1994.
Suppose,  for example, that a given problem is international by its very nature but
suppose that the public does not see the problem in these terms; suppose further that
there is no regime or institution to deal with the problem. Although this is a situation of
purely endogenous internationalisation, public opinion may play an important role, as a
source of pressure for the solution of the problem or as a constraint on the establishment
of an international regime or institution. It is essential therefore to review each of the
subsets of internationalised issues, specifying the role of public opinion  in each
situation . The subsets are highlighted in Figure 3 and consideration of each of them in7
turn enables us to systematically consider the legitimacy problems that can arise as both
nation states and international institutions grapple with the problems that confront them
. 
8
 
1.  The World according to Delors (A   B   C (Fig 3.1))
Set A intersection B intersection C might be labelled "the world according to
Delors",  a world in which the operation of the principle of subsidiarity ensures a link
between the nature of the issue and the claim to competence by the agency of
internationalised governance and in which a rational and attentive public is fully
informed both as to the nature of the issues and as to the policy competences of the
various levels of governance.  Interestingly, Delors himself is on record as envisaging
the principle of subsidiarity extending right up to the international level, creating "a real
equilibrium between the Community level, the national level and the local level [and] I
dare also add the international level..." (Delors, 1991, p. 11). The immediate questions
for empirical investigation are: how extensive is the area included in the overlap defined
in Figure 3.1 and how salient are the problems within it?
Three issues can be said to fall reasonably clearly within this particular sub-set. 
They are scientific research, development aid and the environment.  In 1989, the level of
attributed internationalisation was generally high (see Table 1) and all three are claimed
as areas of competence by the Community  and generally recognised as being
appropriate to that level.  Perhaps the most notable feature of the set is that, out of quite
a wide range of issues, there are only three items in it.  The ideal world of perfect
subsidiarity and (near) perfect information is far from realisation.  
 
2 The Imperious Centre (B ~  A F  C (Fig. 3.2))
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If we are to go by the flood of political analysis and sometimes heated debate
that followed in the wake of the Danish referendum and extended up to and beyond the
French referendum, the part of set B not included in either A or C (set B negation A
union C) was a major factor underlying popular misgivings about the Maastricht Treaty. 
Thus, having defined the set of issues in relation to which the European Community
claims competence or seeks to  exercise jurisdiction without there being an endogenous
basis for  such claims or efforts, the key empirical task is to identify those issues where
the public is resistant to initiatives by the Community, i.e., where there is either zero or
low attributed internationalisation. One would hypothesize that national differentiation
will be  significant in this regard.
Two issues seem to fit into this category.  They are educational standards and
workers' co-determination.  In 1989 they ranked second and third lowest in terms of the
frequency of attributed internationalisation.  It would moreover be difficult to claim that,
aside from the highly specific aspects of mutual recognition of qualifications and social
dumping, there is anything like a consensus that they are by nature internationalised
issues.  Yet the European Community has significant policy competence and has
launched policy initiatives in both areas.   It would appear therefore that these are
areas where the perception of an overweening "Brussels bureaucracy" may obtain. Of
course, before drawing conclusions regarding the consequences of such perceptions for
the legitimacy of the Community, we would need to take account of the salience of the
issues in question. At this stage and on the basis of the available data, it is worth noting
that accounts that argue that the European public has been reacting against "interference
from Brussels" and that this explains the malaise regarding the Maastricht Treaty may be
somewhat exaggerated. There is some evidence of resistance to the imperious centre but
it is limited in its scope and implications.
3 De facto legitimacy (A   B ~  C (Fig. 3.3))
 In the case of the subset of issue orientations in A intersection B negation C,
attributions in public opinion  confer a  certain de-facto legitimacy on the claimed
competences of agencies of internationalised governance.  However, because the claims
are not underpinned by endogenous internationalisation, they are vulnerable to challenge
on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. If successfully challenged and if public
attribution of competence does not rapidly adapt to the new situation, then what had
been a source of de facto legitimacy for internationalised governance could be
transformed into a threat to that legitimacy, i.e., a source of delegitimising demand. 
Since the mid-1970s the European Community has sought to develop a co-
ordinated policy on energy supplies.  In part this policy is rooted in the origins of the
Community in the ECSC and EURATOM. The major source of the policy, however,
has been the objective of security of supply and the relationship between this issue and a
number of foreign policy issues.  It would seem from the data that a substantial section
of the European public agrees that this is an internationalised issue (see Table 1).
Attribution of policy competence is not as high as in the case of the three issues  in the
category of the "world according to Delors" but, at 64 percent (1n 1989) was 
considerable. This illustrates the fact that one cannot take an absolute cut-off point for
attributed internationalisation.  While the issue of energy supplies (as opposed to the
issue of an internal market in energy) can therefore be regarded as having fairly high
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attributed internationalisation, it would be difficult to sustain an argument that it is
endogenously internationalised.  Accordingly, the issue falls into the category of de-
facto legitimacy, i.e., the Community has the backing of the public in its pursuit of
policies in this area but the competence itself is vulnerable in that it is not based on
considerations that are inherent in the nature of the problem.  One might therefore
anticipate that, as the principle of subsidiarity begins to be applied in a serious and
systematic way, this particular policy competence will be curtailed and, in terms of
public opinion, an effort will be required to reorient public expectations in this area
towards the nation-state.
 
4    Delegitimising Demand (A ~  B F  C (Fig. 3.4))
 The sub-set A exclusive of issues in B or C has a particular bearing on
legitimacy because it contains explicit demands for internationalised action that are
neither rooted in the nature of the issues involved nor related to competences claimed by
the agency of internationalised governance. As such it represents an excessive demand
on the agency to which the agency neither does nor could respond. If the issues involved
are salient, there is potential for a rapid loss of legitimacy as the agency of
internationalised governance fails to deliver on the expectations that mass publics have
of it. As suggested above, a significant-roll-back of Community competences could
further enlarge the number of issues in this subset as the Community is prevented from
acting in areas in which expectations have grown or been fostered.
In the first half of 1989, three out of five respondents felt that the problem of
fighting poverty ought to be tackled at a European rather than a national level.  Almost
as many (54 percent) felt the same about the endemic and escalating problem of
unemployment.  While the European Commission has had programmes and policies in
both areas over a considerable period and has recently published a number of reports
setting out policy options in relation to unemployment in particular, Community
initiatives are not capable of solving, indeed are not designed to be the major means of
solving,  either problem.  Therefore, although there is a role in these policy areas for the
Community, the most reasonable assumption would seen to be that, on balance, the
issues are neither endogenously nor exogenously internationalised. Consequently the
Community is in the unenviable position of being expected to lead the battle against
these twin evils without having adequate means with which to do so and without there
being any substantial evidence that either problem could be solved by action undertaken
by the Community.  The potential de-legitimising consequences are underlined by the
fact that these issues, especially unemployment, are highly salient.
 
 
5 Fertile ground (A   C ~  B (Fig. 3.5))
In contrast to the difficulties arising in the previous three subsets, in which an
agency of internationalised governance should rein in its ambitions or at least thread
warily, the subset indicated in Figure 3.5 represents issues in relation to which such an
agency should forge decisively ahead. These (A intersection C excluding issues in B) are
endogenously internationalised issues that are recognised as such by the public.
Internationalised action would be legitimate both in principle and in terms of public
perception. The empirical question, of course, is whether any such issues exist and how
significant and salient are they?
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        Persuasion may take either of two forms. It may be a matter of persuasion by results, that9
is, the public will come to accept the legitimacy of internationalised action ‘ex-post when such
action has been demonstrated to have provided effective solutions to problems. The promotion
of ‘ex-ante legitimacy would require that the issue of competence be directly addressed.
Achieving results via this route may be more difficult but may be necessary in some instances. 
Since the inauguration of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970,
European elites have been inching their way towards a co-ordinated foreign policy. At
the same time, they have jealously guarded their states' prerogatives in this sensitive area
of "high politics". While the Single European Act brought this activity within a treaty
framework, it merely codified existing practice and did not represent any significant
breakthrough in terms of claims to European competence. The Maastricht Treaty
(Article J) has taken some steps in this direction, but the approach is still highly tentative
and qualified. The issue, therefore, cannot be said to be clearly exogenously
internationalised. On the other hand, in a European context, a strong argument can be
made that it is endogenously internationalised. Substantial sections of the European
public seem to concur with this view. As Table 1 shows, in 1989 two-thirds of
respondents  attributed competence for the policy area to the Community. Taking the
Community as a whole, therefore, the  issue falls into the category of "fertile ground".
On the other hand, belonging, as it does, to the realm of "high politics", a common
foreign policy is a very sensitive issue and one would hypothesize that there will be
substantial contrasts between the attitudes of the public in different member states in
relation to it. In those member states in which the attribution of competence is
noticeably lower, the issue may have to be regarded as belonging to the "virgin
territory" category, i.e., as an issue requiring both an extension of Community
competence and persuasion of the public that such an extension is desirable (see below).
 
6 Proceed and persuade. (B   C ~  A (Fig 3.6))
Figure 3.6 on the other hand represents an area  already claimed by the agency
of internationalised governance,  a claim supported by the principle of subsidiarity but
one that requires persuasion if the public is to accept the claim and not regard
internationalised action as "interference in national affairs" . Here again the hypothesis9
of national differentiation arises as it will be important to discover the extent to which
the incidence of issues in this subset varies from country to country. 
In the information society the issue of data protection transcends borders. The
transnational nature of the issue is further enhanced by trans-border police co-operation
in the context of a system of open frontiers. Data protection is also an issue on which
the European Community claims the right to set standards and to bring about
harmonisation.  Proceeding to do so will, however, require a lot of persuasion, as the
evidence shows that, in 1989,  only 42 per cent of the European public saw the need for
a benign European uncle to protect them from Big Brother (Table 1)
It can of course be argued that many issues fall into the proceed and persuade
category in so far as significant minorities withhold attribution of competence to the
Community in regard to issues which are internationalised on the other two dimensions. 
In the case of the issue of environmental protection, for example, in 1989 a minority of
29  per cent  did not attribute competence to the Community. In seeking to explain why
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it is that environmental issues belong to 'the world according to Delors' for some and fall
into the category of 'proceed and persuade' for others, one of the relatively rare pieces
of evidence on policy evaluation available in the Eurobarometer surveys may be of
interest.  The evaluation relates to national rather than European authorities and is in
response to the question "do you know if in (your country), the responsible authorities
are concerned with the protection of the environment?  If yes, do you think the
authorities are doing an effective job or not?" In spring 1988, only one in four of the
citizens of Europe gave a positive response to this question, i.e., believed that the
national authorities were both concerned and effective.  The majority (57 per cent)
believed that they were concerned but not effective and 29 per cent thought that they
were not even concerned. Unfortunately it is not possible to test the hypothesised
relationship between evaluation of national action and attribution of competence to the
Community as the attribution question was not asked in the Eurobarometer that carried
the evaluation question.
 
7 Virgin Territory (C ~  A F  B (Fig 3.7))
Issues in sub-set C exclusive of those in A or B represent virgin territory in the
sense that the agency of internationalised governance has not made any claims in the
area, the public does not attribute competence to the Community but the problems are
inherently transnational.  Here we would expect an expansion of agency competence but
anticipate that, particularly in the current climate in Europe, it might be done only with
difficulty in so far as competences not founded either on precedent or on public
attribution may well be contested.  
Although, in Europe as a whole, foreign policy constitutes fertile ground where
the Community can, in virtue of the combination of endogenous and widespread
attributed internationalisation,  confidently develop its capacity, in certain member states
this policy area may belong rather to the category of virgin territory, i.e., the category of
issues that are endogenously transnational but where, were the Community to make
major claims to competence, such claims would not be supported by public opinion.
Figure 4 illustrates the point with data on the attribution of competence for foreign
policy issues in the second half of 1989. In the countries on the left hand side of the
graph - Greece, Portugal and Denmark - this issue falls fairly clearly into the virgin
territory category. In the countries on the right hand side - Italy, Belgium, and France -
the issue is fertile ground, i.e., there is widespread support for an extension of
Community competence in this endogenously internationalised area. The countries in the
middle are mixed cases with majorities in favour of an extension of competence but with
substantial minorities waiting to be convinced. 
 
Conclusion
The first part of this paper argued that the relevance of public opinion to the
process of the internationalisation of governance in general and to European integration
in particular can be inferred not just from recent events but also from theories of
political integration and from international relations theory. Though the empirical
analysis presented in Part II of the paper is still at a preliminary stage, it suggests that
the legitimacy of internationalised governance is a highly differentiated phenomenon that
20
varies from one policy sector to another. It depends, moreover, on the relationship
between public perceptions and expectations on the one hand and  the nature of the
problems being confronted and the claims of the Community or other agency of
internationalised governance on the other. This relationship also varies across countries
and over time. In the case of the European Community, the implications are that its
legitimacy is not just a matter of generalised support for the Community as such and
that an adequate investigation of it must go beyond the traditional indicators of support
for European unification and must take into account both the nature of the issues in
question and considerations of institutional design and, in particular, the problem of
allocating policy competence within a multi-layered system. 
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